Facing Death: Four Literary Accounts by Kolenda, Konstantin
Philosophic Exchange
Volume 15
Number 1 Volume 15-16 (1984-1985) Article 2
1-1-1984
Facing Death: Four Literary Accounts
Konstantin Kolenda
Rice University
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons
@Brockport. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophic Exchange by
an authorized editor of Digital Commons @Brockport. For more
information, please contact kmyers@brockport.edu.
Repository Citation
Kolenda, Konstantin (1984) "Facing Death: Four Literary Accounts," Philosophic Exchange: Vol. 15 : No. 1 , Article 2.
Available at: http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol15/iss1/2
Konstantin Kolenda 
Rice University 
1
Kolenda: Facing Death: Four Literary Accounts
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2015
Facing Death: Four Literary Accounts 
Konstantin Kolenda 
Fa wt 
A free man thinks of death least of all 
things; and his wisdom is a meditation 
not of death but of life. 
Spinoza 's Ethics 
Death is a way to be, which Dasein 
takes over as soon as it is. 
Heidegger's Being and Time 
When his close friend Friedrich Schiller died in 1905, Goethe refused 
to attend the funeral. All his life he had an almost moribid dislike of 
such ceremonies and avoided anything that had to do with death and 
dying. In his essay on Nature Goethe claimed that the fear of death 
was really love of life and speculated that death was just a trick of life 
to have more life. On his own death bed his last words were "More 
light." One might wonder what lofty thoughts he meant to communi­
cate, even though one witness suggested that he simply wanted the 
window shades to be raised. 
If we tum to Goethe's drama Faust, on which he worked almost his 
entire lifetime, we find reasons for suspecting that the protagonist is 
engaged in a deliberate denial of death. When at the end of his incred­
ible exploits with the devil's help Faust senses that his end may be 
near, his inner doubts come to him in the shape of Care which 
appears in the company of her three sisters: Dearth, Debt, and Trou­
ble, and all three announce the imminent arrival of their brother, 
Death. Faust does not quite follow what the specters are saying, 
although he seems to make out the word "death." It is significant that 
the foreboding of his final hour comes to him indirectly, via the per­
sonifications of other life-denying phenomena. 
It is also important that in order to be in Faust's presence, Care has 
to enter through a keyhole. As an insidious, paralyzing force, Care 
was inimical to Faust's fundamental attitude of life. For a variety of 
reasons he was immune to it. One of them was of course his titanism, 
his immense hunger for experience. A person with such an attitude is 
likely to be insulated from will-destroying phenomena. His stubborn 
vitality was a formidable obstacle to ennui, vacillation, despair, and 
doublemindedness. True, Faust was afflicted by this debilitating mal­
ady at the beginning of the drama and was even on the verge of 
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committing suicide. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that 
what broke this ennui was his pact with the devil. If we examine that 
pact carefully, we will find that it is not really a utilitarian bargain but 
an act of defiance. Faust dares the devil to subdue his immense craving 
for experience, adventure, for endless exploration. When he signs 
with his blood on the dotted line, he is sure that the devil will lose. 
We must not overlex>k that by the time he goes through the cha­
rade with the devil, Faust's inner strength has been already restored . 
His attempt at suicide has been interrupted by the ringing of Easter 
bells. The bells are a symbol of resurrection, in a wider sense than the 
theological. As Goethe points out in the drama, Faust understands the 
bells to be calling people back to the reality of all the good things that 
make life worthwhile -- spring, celebration, job, wonder, exuberance, 
fellow feeling. Faust experiences all these emotions when he joins the 
throng of simple people, for whom the Resurrection of the Lord in 
fact connotes all these human values. 
It would be wrong, therefore, to assume that Faust signs the pact 
with the devil in a moment of weakness, of spiritual exhaustion. By 
that time he has already worked his way, by himself, or perhaps by 
responding to the everpresent and everactive force of nature symbol .. 
ized by Easter bells, out of his temporary exhaustion and ennui. 
When he confronts the devil, he confronts him as a kind of man the 
Lord described him in the Prologue, namely, a good man, who in 
spite of the obscurity of his impulses knows the right and the true 
way. And the Lord is not likely to be mistaken. 
It is important to note this early characterization of Faust, because 
it remains true to the end. He is the servant of life, and is so to the 
hilt. He has made up his mind that the path "to the beyond" is of no 
interest and of no consequence to a being whose task is to serve this 
life, this earth. Faithful to his commitment, the only thing Faust is 
afraid of is that his dedication to living to the fullest might be under .. 
mined. He vehemently rejects Care and her cohorts precisely for that 
reason. The words he speaks make this attitude abundantly clear: 
Accursed specters! Thus you treat the human race a 
thousand times over; even neutral days you transform 
into a loathsome tangle of ensnaring torments. 
Demons, I know, are hard to get rid of, for the stern 
bond of the spirit cannot be broken; yet your power, 
0 care, insidiously great as it is, I shall not acknowledge. 1  
The only thing Car� can do to Faust is to blind him. The damage 
she does affects his finite, vulnerable body, but not his spirit. 
Although blind, Faust still is guided by the brightly burning light of 
his unconquerable activism. He orders that the work of reclaiming the 
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swamp and building the canal be continued. What he talces to be the 
clanging of spades enlarging his canal is in fact the digging of his grave. 
It might be tempted to speculate here that Faust is repressing the 
awareness of the sneaky approach of death, but another and simpler 
explanation is available to us, an explanation which is supported by all 
we know about his character. Faust is oblivious to death. He is so 
absorbed in his life project that nothing can distract him from it, even 
if we, the outsiders, can see that he is mistalcen. But nothing in the 
drama shows that he is self-deceived. 
He does, even in the final moments deceive the devil, thus proving 
that his initial resolve to hold his own against Mephistopheles is being 
lived up to. Perhaps the manner in which Faust gets the upper hand 
over the devil in his final pronouncement just before he dies is ques­
tionable. It might even be called quibbling. The words which Faust 
speaks do contain the formula which, when pronounced, should give 
Mephistopheles the right to his soul: "Do stay with me, you are so 
good.'' But notice that his formula is offered in the subjunctive. He 
would be satisfied, if that which he desires were to happen. Faust even 
says that he anticipates that moment. Should that moment come, Faust 
would "stand on free ground with a free people." But that possibility 
is not yet actual, at least Mephistopheles has not produced it. 
One might, with some justification, say that Faust, and Goethe with 
him, pulls a fast trick. But the intent of the trick is clear and is con­
·sistent with what Goethe told us about Faust's attitude to life. The 
value of that attitude is indicative of the nature of ultimate reality, 
symbolized in the drama by God and by the elaborate salvation scene 
with which the drama ends. Faust is worthy of salvation because he 
lives up to what is expected of him as a good man, as God's servant. 
He was so completely devoted to his task on earth that he refused to 
be distracted from it by any thoughts of otherworldly rewards and 
punishments. Altogether oblivious to death, he has no interest in it 
and devotes no thought to it. He refuses to make it an object of his 
concern. 
Kurtt 
Joseph Conrad's Kurtz in Heart of Darkness is a Faustian character. 
Like Faust, he enters into a pact with the devil. The circumstances 
under which he does so are hidden from the reader, but the contrast 
between what Kurtz was before he came to the Congo and what he 
became after "the jungle patted him on the head" justifies the conclu­
sion that there was a drastic change inside Kurtz's soul. As Marlow 
puts it, his soul went mad. Like Faust, Kurtz was an extraordinary 
individual. People who knew him were impressed by his intelligence, 
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ambition, literary and artistic talents. His fine organizational abilities 
earned him a responsible position in the task of collecting ivory from 
the natives after he joined the Congo expedition. Like Goethe's Faust, 
he has a great deal of personal charm and inspired deep love of a sen­
sitive and pure woman. The ability to impress people with his broad 
knowledge and expansive eloquence stood him in good stead also 
after the "conversion" has occurred. Not only the natives for whom 
he became a god, but also the colorful and philosophical Russian sai­
lor, who attached him.self to Kurtz in his outpoSt, were fascinated by 
his personality. 
Admittedly, in contrast to Goethe, who depicts Faust's alliance 
with the devil as a personal decision, Conrad suggests that the fateful 
change in Kum's heart reflects the hollowness and insecurity of 
W estem man in general. On its surface, Western civilization seems 
motivated by high, noble ideals. But when you look at it more closely, 
the veneer of highmindedness disappears and reveals crass and 
exploitative motives. The entire project of colonization was but a pre­
text to engage in robbery on a grand scale, disguised as an august and 
benevolent enterprise. Kum's high ambition to become a famous 
journalist, or a statesman, or a celebrated artist is suddenly replaced 
by a naked desire for wealth and domination. 
It is not clear from the novel what were the real precipitating 
causes. One may speculate that one of them was the European enth­
nocentrism. In spite of the supposed enlightenment and broad­
mindedness, in spite of centuries of Christian morality that enjoins 
the love of all humanity the colonizers fell morally apart when they 
confronted the culturally different inhabitants of the dark continent. 
It did not occur to them that in Africa they were in the presence of 
just another edition of common humanity, and they treated the 
natives cruelly and with criminal indifference, oblivious to the hor­
rendous suffering they caused. Even Marlow, who was given the role 
of a detached, impartial, but sensitive spectator, sympathized with his 
fellow-whites and wondered whether the Africans were like the rest of 
humanity. Occasionally he had a glimpse of belonging to the same 
race with them, but this insight, instead of delighting him, left him 
nonplussed and alarmed. 
Thus at least a part of the explanation for Kum's becoming a ruth­
less exploiter of the natives was the moral bewilderment he shared 
with the rest of the invading whites. This bewilderment, coupled with 
plain greed, allowed him to resort to unspeakable abominations, by 
means of which, with the help of thundering firearms, he gained 
power over the natives. If there was an inner struggle in Kurtz at the 
time he embarked upon his infamous exploits, we have a bare hint of 
it, when Conrad tells us that the idealistic pamphlet about the white 
man's civilizing mission, written by Kurtz before he came to the 
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Congo, was later subscripted by him: " Exterminate the brutes! ' '  
The psychological center of Conrad's novel, however, is Kurtz's 
struggle with himself on his deathbed when he finally pronounced a 
verdict on what has happened to him, or more correctly, on what he 
allowed to happen to himself. His words, nThe horror! the horror! "  
acquired a revelatory significance for Marlow who watched Kurtz,s 
inner srruggle . His illness and imminent death forced upon Kurtz the 
task of coming to terms with himself. Underneath the surface events 
which Conrad describes in the story, a mighty contest was playing 
itself between Kurtz and the approaching death. And the referee Mar, 
low, the only person genuinely interested in the outcome of this 
struggle, proclaimed Kurtz the victor! 
The question was whether Kurtz would die before arriving at a truth, 
ful account and evaluation of what had happened to him when the 
jungle patted him on the head. The words of self,revulsion pr0' 
claimed the verdict. Kurtz died undeceived, fully aware of what he 
allowed his life to become: horrible. What impressed Marlow was the 
enormity of the struggle that took place in Kurtz's soul, first in his 
stockade among the natives whom he ruled, and later on the steamer. 
Marlow believed himself to be witnessing a titanic contest between 
two sides of the human spirit: ambition and honesty . Kurtz was rnak, 
ing mighty strides toward realizing his ambitions, but at what cost? 
That question he suppressed or avoided as long as he was intoxicated 
by his success. But when illness came and his energies departed, he 
had time to reflect and to look into himself. The imminence of death 
was an occasion either to come clean or to keep lying to himself ,, and 
lying, Marlow had told us, has a taint of death in it. So by turning 
against that enemy Kurtz was in effect gaining victory over death. He 
did not allow it to overtake him before it was too late. That's why 
Marlow admired him and tried to protect his memory as much as he 
could. 
Marlow's admiration for Kurtz's struggle with and eventual victory 
over death was in part a result of comparing Kurtz's way of handling 
this ultimate crisis with what Marlow saw happening in other cases, 
his own included. About himself he says: 
I have wrestled with death. It is the most unexciting 
contest you can imagine. It takes place in impalpable 
grayness, with nothing underfoot, with nothing around, 
without the great desire of victory, without the great 
fear of defeat, in a sickly atmosphere of tepid scepticism, 
without much belief in your own right, and still less in 
that of your adversary. If such is the ultimate wisdom, 
then life is a greater riddle than some of us think it to be.2 
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In contra.st, Marlow regarded Kum's final outcry on his deathbed 
as "an affirmation, a moral victory paid for by innumerable defeats, 
by abominable terror, by abominable satisfactions," The grim verdict 
behind Kum's final words elevated him, in Marlow's mind, above the 
common man and thereby wrested the truth away from the swiftly 
approaching death. Conrad's story, in contrast to Goethe's drama, 
assigns to death, as a threat of complete meaninglessness, the dramatic 
power of releasing from the human spirit a desperate effort to render 
an honest verdict about oneself. Instead of being oblivious to death, 
as was Faust, Kum used the approach of death as an occasion for con­
fessional self-condemnation. For Marlow, it was a remarkable feat, 
even though it left life "a greater riddle than some of us think it to 
be." 
Throughout the story Melville tells us nothing about Billy Budd's own 
thoughts or state of mind at any stage of the depicted events, but the 
confident third-person narrative encourages in the reader the assu­
rance that he knows .. the handsome sailor" quite well. One of the 
essential things the author communicates about his hero is Billy's 
i.nnocence, an absolute lack of guile. He is almost unbelievably trust­
worthy, straightforward, and honest. His guilelessness would look like 
stupidity, a total lack of worldly wisdom, were it not for the fact that 
Billy is also a competent, quick learner who performs his tasks cheer­
fully and efficiently. His easy-going manner and transparent good will 
are quickly noted and appreciated by the crew and the officers, except 
for Claggart, who for some inscrutable reasons is disquieted by Billy's 
angelic nature and plots to do him in. The young sailor's innocence 
prevents him from seeing Claggart's sinister designs. When he is sud­
denly and unexpectedly accused in Captain Vere's presence of plot­
ting mutiny, the surprise generates a shock. Unable to express his out­
rage, because he suffers from a speech impediment in stressful 
moments, Billy uncontrolledly hits out at Claggart, causing his death. 
His innocence left Billy unprepared for such a horrendous treachery, 
and his reaction was almost an automatic bodily reflex, bypassing his 
mind. Unfortunately for him, due to the special circumstances this 
spontaneous action cost him his life -- he was condemned to be 
hanged. 
Whether this condemnation was justified is a complex matter, 
deserving a detailed treatment. What interests us now is how Billy 
faced his death. Although Melville limits himself to a small number o1 
clues, he makes it clear that Billy faced death the same way he led his 
life - as just another occasion to be himself. ln that regard there is 
a parallel between Faust and Budd; both remain true to their basic 
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character. Both are oblivious to death, in the sense that it does not 
change their fundamental outlook. Certainly. some important con­
rrasts are there. Faust is old, experienced, and self-conscious. Billy is 
young, innocent, and totally unselfconscious. But Billy, like Faust, 
does not hesitate to use his final moments in the way he used his all 
other moments of life: to advance whatever causes seem worthy of 
support at the moment. 
In one poignant scene Melville speculates what Captain Vere prob­
ably said to Billy in their private meeting. 
It would have been in consonance with the spirit of 
Captain Vere should he on this occasion have concealed 
nothing from the condemned one -- should he indeed have 
frankly disclosed to him that part himself had played 
in bringing about the decision, at the same time revealing 
his actuating motives. On Billy's side it is not 
improbable that such a confession would have been received 
in much the same spirit that prompted it. Not without 
a sort of joy indeed he might have appreciated the brave 
opinion of him implied in his Captain making such a 
confidant of him. Nor, as to the sentence itself could he 
have been insensible that it was imparted to him as to one 
not afraid to die. Even more may have been. Captain Vere 
in the end may have developed the passion sometimes latent 
under an interior stoical and indifferent. He was old 
enough to have been Billy's father. The austere devotee 
of military duty letting himself melt back into what 
remains primeval in our formalized humanity may in the end 
have caught Billy to his heart even as Abraham may have 
caught young Isaak on the brink of resolutely offering 
him up in obedience to exacting behest. 3 
By refraining from telling us anything about the way Billy felt about 
his self-sacrifice, Melville forces the reader to be guided only by the 
characterization of Billy offered before the tragic development. But 
Billy's behavior clearly indicates that what he was doing at the final 
moments was no different from what he was doing all along -- unself­
consciously and selflessly he advanced whatever worthwhile cause life 
placed before him. 
Melville's account of the conversation with Vere leaves no other 
inference possible than that Billy deliberately chose to support his 
captain in the crucial task of preventing mutiny from breaking out. 
The fact that the crew echoed his shout "Long live Captain Vere! " 
just before being hanged must be included among factors that actually 
kept the crew under Vere's control. This was the last service the 
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young foretopman rendered to his captain. Thus, we are not unj usti­
fied in concluding that, like Faust, Billy was oblivious to his death, or 
rather, used it as a means of bringing about something he believed to 
be import.ant. Perhaps it was easy for him to face death in this way 
because in all of his young life Billy was doing nothing e�. 
Meunault 
Another famous literary account of an impending execution is that of 
Meursault in Camus' Stranger. In that story also a young man is sud­
denly facing death. Like Billy Budd, Meursault is .barely in the thres­
hold of adulthood. But in contrast to Budd, Meursault is strangely 
detached from life around him. Indeed, he is a stranger to himself. 
Events impinge on his psyche lightly; he does not feel their weight. 
Occurences that ordinarily strike people as eventful concern him only 
superficially, if at all. His mother's death and funeral do not touch 
him. He goes through conventional motions expected on such occa­
sions, but he sees no significance in them. Things that matter to oth­
ers do not matter to Meursault. He is not a wicked man. In fact, he 
seems a decent chap. He earns his living. He is a respectable, punctual, 
though not overly ambitious employee. He enjoys the simple plea­
sures of life -- going to the beach, watching the comings and goings of 
city life from his apartment window, catching a ride on a moving 
truck. He carries on an affair with a wholesome girl and stands in a 
friendly relation to several acquaintances. When asked for a favor he 
easily obliges without weighing any advantages for himself. 
And yet, even the small, simple pleasures he gets out of life do not 
engage him strongly. He takes things as they come; they do not arouse 
his interest in any firm and steady way. Things swim in and out of his 
consciousness, and he does not dwell on them with any degree of 
intensity. He enjoys making love to Marie, but he resists her attempts 
to interpret it as a sign of love for her. When she asks whether he 
wants to get married he is willing to do so, if it really is a matter of 
importance to her. To him it is not. But nor marrying is not important 
to him either; as far as he is concerned, he could take it or leave it. To 
be sure, he often finds things strange or stupid, but he is not really 
concerned or indignant. When some unwelcome things happen to 
him, he is annoyed and somewhat put off. But he does not dwell on 
such events; they do not touch him in a lasting way. Literally, he 
keeps his cool. 
Meursault is very responsive to the scenery around him ; his gaze 
takes in things and events as they happen, and he absorbs them in a 
detached, spectator-like way. He briefly muses over what he sees, but 
his musing is short-lived and his observations pass unscrutinized. 
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When he listens to what is being said about him during the trial, he 
comments: «I never have been able to regret anything at all in all my 
life. I've always been far too much absorbed in the present moment, 
or the immediate future, to think back . "  
His receptiveness to stimuli operates not only on the intellectual 
level but also on the emotional and behavioral levels. Natural pheno-­
mena strongly impress themselves on his psyche. He is very conscious 
of the effects of the sun, sky, water. Bodily sensations seem to domi­
nate his awareness. The weather, the time of day, dusk or dawn, affect 
the way he feels. Even the key events of his life seem to be almost 
determined by natural phenomena. The fateful shooting of the Arab is 
seen by him as a result of the sun's rays reflected in the blade of the 
knife. Camus leaves no doubt in the reader's mind that Meursault 
never intended to kill the Arab. He is probably truthful and quite cor­
rect in telling the court when asked directly why he fired the first 
shot, "It was because of the sun. 1 1  
Meursault's arrest and trial gradually force him out of his detach­
ment. It is almost a surprise for him to find that he has a definite per­
sonal identity. That identity at first emerges as the target of society's 
indignation. Although he is being tried for murder, Meursault soon 
finds out that his crime consists primarily in failing to behave in 
accordance with conventional rules: he smokes and drinks coffee dur­
ing the wake for his mother, he goes to see a comic movie with his 
girlfriend and takes her to bed right after his mother's funderal, and 
most importantly, he refuses to profess a belief in God. Camus 
makes it clear that Meursault would not have been condemned to die 
if he had indicated a willingness to bow in the direction of conven­
tional beliefs of his society. But Meursault refuses to do so, and his 
personal identity begins to define itself in terms of his opposition to 
society. In the dramatic scene with the priest after being condemned 
to death, he suddenly becomes an impassioned protagonist of his det­
ached, estranged, free-floating way of life and defends it in an elo-­
quent outburst. 
Meursault's newly found commitment to his casual, carefree style 
of life is so strong that he is using his impending execution as an ally 
in his battle against the stuffy , freedom-denying values of his society. 
In the face of death, he is "ready to start life over again. 1 1  
It was as if that great rush of anger had washed me clean, 
emptied me of hope, and, gazing up at the dark sky spangled 
with its signs and stars, for the first time, the first, 
I laid my heart open to the benign indifference of the 
universe. To feel it so like myself, indeed, so brotherly, 
made me realize that I'd been happy, and that I was happy 
still. For all to be accomplished, for me to feel less 
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lonely, all that remained to hope was that on the day of my 
execution there should be a huge crowd of spectators and that 
they should greet me with howls of execration .4 
The philosophical focus of Camus' story lies in Meursault's transi­
tion from nonchalant indifference to absolute commitment, from 
being a paradoxically selfless egoist thoughtlessly pursuing objectives 
that float into his circumstances to suddenly becoming aware that he 
can take a position on his life, that he can set himself against the 
world, thus acquiring an identify of his own. The measure of this 
commitment is the fervor with which he accepts his death. Indeed , he 
welcomes his death as substantiating, paradoxically and absurdly, his 
barely discovered but already doomed personal reality. 
Spirnn:a OT Heidegger? 
Martin Heidegger's analysis of the meaning of death in Being and Time 
has been received by many philosophers and theologians as a tre­
mendous insight into the human situation.6 Although the details of 
Heidegger's discussion are complex and are clothed in startling neolo­
gisms, his essential objective is to point up the relevance of death to 
every moment of living, as revealed in his quote, "As soon as man 
comes to life, he is at once old enough to die. "7 Human existence is 
characterized as being-towards-death (Sein-sum-T ode). Inauthentic exist­
ence covers up the fact of one's death by resorting to various strate­
gies of deflecting a person's attention from its inescapability and by 
thinking of it as only an external possibility, merely to be expected as 
an objective occurrence. Authentic existence takes up its own inevita­
ble demise subjectively into account, and by anticipating it, makes it a 
part of one's innermost being. The mode of this anticipation is not 
fear but anxiety, a form of care concerning the meaning of one's own 
individual existence. "Death does not j ust 'belong' to one's Dasein in 
an undifferentiated way, death lays claim to it as an individual 
Dasein." 
Heidegger's view is diametrically opposed to that of Spinoza, who 
did not think that the inclusion of the fact of death among one's con­
cerns is a mark of wisdom. In denying that one's own death is a possi­
ble object of thought, Spinoza was echoing the Stoics' observation 
that "where we are, death is not, and where death is, we are not." A 
more recent version of this view was expressed by Wittgenstein when 
he noted that death is not an event in life, because we cannot expe, 
rience its completion. Similarly, Proust spoke of "the mind's inability 
when it ponders death, to picture something other than life. , , Woody 
Allen gave a witty twist to this logical conundrum: " It is not that I am 
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afraid to die. I just don't -want to be around when it happens. "  Allen's 
formulation calls attention to the difference between the fact of death 
and the concern about death. Paul Ed-wards has criticized at length 
Heidegger's blurring of this distinction. Of course human beings, 
unlike plants and animals, can know that they are going to die, and 
that knowledge can influence them in various ways. But to say this is 
not to express a deep original thought but a platitude, concludes 
Edwards.8 
Nevertheless, Heidegger's and Spinoza 's respective positions on 
what we should think of death are mutually incompatible, and the 
question worth asking is whether the four literary accounts we have 
examined tend to support one view or the other. It is not a question 
of finding empirical evidence for either position. Just how and in what 
way empirical evidence, including fictional reflection on the human 
condition, supports a philosophical position is difficult to say. 
Neither Spinoza nor Heidegger is telling us what is the case, nor are 
they offering us a psychological or sociological account. Rather, draw­
ing on whatever experience they regard as relevant, they recommend a 
certain attitude toward the fact of our mortality. After all, Heidegger 
distinguished between the authentic and the inauthentic ways of 
being, and Spinoza urged us to cultivate active rather than passive 
emotions, and in the passage quoted above spoke not of all persons 
but only of those who are free and wise. We can profitably tum to 
literary works for a possible corroboration of philosophical recom­
mendations, because artists often succeed in selecting for attention 
situations of deep and universal human significance. 
To my view, the stories we have examined definitely support Spino­
za 's view. In all cases, the concern about death, contrary to Heidegger 's 
recommendation, does not permeate their characters' lives; their 
existence is not being-towards-death. Faust is the most glaring case. 
Death does not concern him in the least; he has no interest in it. 
Everything he does is in the service of expanding the range of his 
experience. One might say that Faust never even faces death. He 
refuses to be involved in any deliberation in which the consideration 
of death is a factor. The reason why he vehemently rejects Care is 
because she brings in her wake specters that paralyze the human will. 
Man strives �s long as he lives, and this means that death, as the. stop­
page of striving, is the moral enemy of the human spirit. As such, it 
cannot belong to what is essentially human; on the contrary, if 
included in one's purview, it would undermine what is most charac­
teristic of humanity. 
In contrast to Faust, Kurtz does not avoid the stare of death when 
he realizes that it is imminent. But what does the contemplation of his 
lurking death prompt Kurtz to do? It forces him to rethink his life, to 
reexamine the motives and the consequences of his actions. Morally 
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speaking, his illness and his awareness of impending death were a 
boon to him. Had he no occasion to brood over his deeds while lying 
deathly ill, first in his stock.ade and later on the deck of the steamer, 
had he suddenly died at the height of his ivory-grabbing exploits, he 
would not have achieved what Marlow later was to describe as a vic­
tory. In that sense, Kurtz's being-towards--death played a positive role 
in his truthful self-discovery. His struggle with his soul, from which 
he emerged an honest and cleansed m.an, was precipitated by his 
inability to continue unimpeded in his rush toward wealth and power. 
It is not that he was afraid to die; his anxiety was generated by his not 
wanting to die as a person who had neglected to pronounce a correct 
judgment on his life. 
Thus his illness and his confrontation with death was one of his 
life's possibilities, and he m.ade use of it in a way that impressed the 
person who witnessed that confrontation. Marlow felt privileged to 
watch the inner dram.a of the dying man. Given his circumstances, 
Kurtz lived authentically in the face of death, and only within these 
circumstances does the tallc of Heideggerian authenticity m.alce sense. 
Before he faced up to the imminence of his demise, he couldn't have 
been described as living inauthentically; he was not den:ying de.ath, 
because he was engrossed in the pursuit of his ambitious project. That 
pursuit was authentic in its own way; it expressed Kurtz's own delib­
erately and freely chosen goals. But in facing death Kurtz was provide< 
with an opportunity to revise his estim.ate of the meaning of these 
goals, and he revised them in the direction of truth. He used that 
opportunity well. 
How did Billy Budd get on a collision course with death? By sheer 
accident, through a stroke of fate. Until Claggart suddenly accused 
him of fomenting mutiny, Billy's general attitude couldn't possibly be 
described as being-towards.-death. His demeanor exuded cheerful 
innocence, disregard of danger, and the willingness to undertake wha· 
tever tasks were put before him. Like Faust, he seemed oblivious to 
the possibility of death, unaware of its possible relevance. Indeed, the: 
grandeur of his heroism in the face of death is underscored by the 
easy transition he has made from being unaware of death to having tc 
face it so suddenly. Temperamentally he was completely unprepared 
for it. Had Melville chosen to represent him as a reflective, philoso­
phical person who thought about the eventuality of death and who 
was guided by this awareness in his daily actions, Billy would have 
been less heroic, less of an astounding human phenomenon Mellvile 
wanted him to be. Part of the author's purpose was to put his charac 
ter on a collision course with death, into an awareness of being­
towards-death, suddenly and unexpectedly. The astounding thing wa 
the easy way in which Billy made the transition from wholeheartedly 
being-toward-life to being-towards-death. 
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But this contrived Heideggerese vocabulary is misleading when app-­
lied to Billy. It would be more accurate to say that he converted his 
predicament, his impending execution, into one more, his last, oppor­
tunity to serve life. The enthusiasm he put into his final exclamation 
"Long Live Captain Vere! " testifies to the fact that he treated the 
necessity of facing death as one of the possibilities of life. In that 
regard, although inexperiened and unreflective, Billy was like Faust: 
he converted every situation into an opportunity to contribute to 
whatever worthwhile cause he ran across. That's why he throws him­
self behind his captain's difficult task of maintaining the discipline 
and battle-readiness of the Indomitable. It is the seeming obliviousness 
to his own death, his nonchalant dismissal of it, that makes the young 
sailor so extraordinary. But Melville portrays him as true to his char­
acter to the very end, leaving the leader astounded and humbled. Billy 
lived and died as Spinoza's free man, even if his wisdom was almost 
instinctive, a gift of nature. 
The person who comes closest to embracing a Heideggerian posi­
tion is Meursault, the most "existentialist" character of the four. He 
comes alive as an active protagonist only when his death appears to 
him inevitable. The thought that he will die ignites in him, for the first 
time in his life, a spark of responsiveness to what life had to offer. 
Suddenly he realizes that he was happy and is happy still. One may 
wonder why it takes a confrontation with death to elicit a positive 
response to at least some things that people usually care about. Meur­
sault's previous apathy, his anemic response to whatever came his 
way, be it Marie's love or the Arab's death, is replaced by an affirma­
tion of the natural sources of human happiness or suffering. He is 
shaken out of his indifference when he takes his own impending death 
into account. One might say of Meursault that he became normally 
human only as he turned into a being-towards-death, when he per­
ceived that death belonged to his Dasein. Up to that moment, we may 
say with Heidegger, he existed inauthentically. 
But this is precisely the least convincing aspect of Camus' story. 
There is nothing in Meursault prior to his "existentialist" insight that 
prepares us for that "conversion." Furthermore, his easy-going nih­
ilism of pre-conversion days was not really affected by his insight. 
Looking back at his relation to Marie, or to Raymond, he did not 
ascribe to either any moral significance, nor did he regret anything he 
had done, including the death of the Arab. His attitude to moral 
aspects of his life remained unchanged, and being-towards-death did 
not alert him to the need of appraising the significance of what he was 
doing in life. In that regard, he totally lacked the capacity for self­
judgment, so prominently manifested in Kurtz. Meursault's basic 
stance remained completely amoral; he looked at his life from a 
purely esthetic point of view. Even the happiness he experienced was 
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csthetic, in a metaphysical sort of way. In that sense he remained, and 
died, a stranger. 
When Camus later, in a postscript to the novel, referred to its hero 
as 0the only Christ we deserve," he emphasized Meursault's honesty, 
his refusal to play the hypocritical game of his society, his desire to 
live in the truth. But Camus goes too far, it seems to me, when he says 
of his hero that . ,Far from being bereft of all feeling, he is animated by 
a passion that is deep because it is stubborn, a passion for the abso­
lute and the truth." Conrad's Marlow also has a passion for truth and 
believes that lying has a taint of death in it. But he cannot bring him­
self to tell the truth about Kurtt's final words to his intended, because 
he thinks that such a discl0&ure would be "too dark." From what 
Camus tells us about his hero we can conclude that Meursault's pas­
sion for truth would have made him indifferent to Marlow's scruples. 
One cannot help feeling uneasy about such an absolutising of one 
value: it appears to be oblivous to all other values. Camus is right 
when he goes on to describe his hero's passion as negative, but he is 
mistaken when he concludes that such a negative passion alone "is a 
condition of a conquest of ourselves or of the world." No matter how 
important and admirable such a negative passion may be, it neverthe­
less leaves Meursault without any appreciation of qualities that give 
life positive meaning. "This is my way. What is yours?",  asks 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra. Up to the dramatic confrontation with the 
priest, Meursault had no way he could call his. The one he articulates 
after the confrontation shows much metaphysical pathos but no 
moral direction. 9 
And yet, Meursault transforms his encounter with death into an 
occasion to rescue his life from the grip of apathy. As he says, he 
opens his heart to the benign indifference of the universe. The impor­
tant fact, however, is not that the universe remains indifferent, but 
that Meursault is no longer so, because his heart has responded. Were 
he to receive a last minute reprieve from the guillotine, his attitude to 
life would have been radically different from what it was before, 
unless, of course, his conversion should tum out to be just a self­
deceived pathos of the moment and not a real insight, as Camus seems 
to present it. But even when we take into account certain misgivings 
and reservations about Meursault, all four of our fictional characters 
definitely bear out Spinoza's view. To the extent that human beings 
live up to their freedom, they use it to grow in wisdom -- to heighten 
their self-understanding, to advance the cause in which they believe, 
or to salvage what is salvageable. Because they face death in that spirit, 
all four qualify as Servants of Life. 
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